Legitimacy, Adaptation and Resilience in Ecosystem Management by Cosens, Barbara
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Articles Faculty Works 
2013 
Legitimacy, Adaptation and Resilience in Ecosystem Management 
Barbara Cosens 
University of Idaho College of Law, bcosens@uidaho.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
18(1) Ecology & Soc'y 3 (2013) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For 
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Cosens, B. A. 2013. Legitimacy, adaptation, and resilience in ecosystem management. Ecology and Society 
18(1): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05093-180103
Insight, part of a Special Feature on Law and Social-Ecological Resilience 
Legitimacy, Adaptation, and Resilience in Ecosystem Management
Barbara A. Cosens 1
ABSTRACT. Ecologists have made great strides in developing criteria for describing the resilience of an ecological system. In
addition, expansion of that effort to social-ecological systems has begun the process of identifying changes to the social system
necessary to foster resilience in an ecological system such as the use of adaptive management and integrated ecosystem
management. However, these changes to governance needed to foster ecosystem resilience will not be adopted by democratic
societies without careful attention to their effect on the social system itself. Delegation of increased flexibility for adaptive
management to resource management agencies must include careful attention to assuring that increased flexibility is exercised
in a manner that is legitimate and responsive to the social system. Similarly, democratic systems proceed in incremental steps
and are not likely to adopt wholesale changes to achieve integrated ecosystem management. This paper uses the concept of
legitimacy in governance as a necessary component of any change to achieve greater social-ecological resilience and will turn
to network theory as a means to facilitate legitimacy across multiple jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Managing for sustainability of ecological systems requires
development of processes for governance that account for the
complexity and uncertainty of the social-ecological system.
The emerging ecological concept of resilience provides an
umbrella theory for integrating concepts of ecosystem
management with ecological response to achieve
sustainability (Walker et al. 2004).  
Resilience is a measure of the amount of perturbation a social-
ecological system can withstand and still maintain the same
structure and functions; it addresses the ability of a complex
system to continue to provide a full range of ecosystem
services in the face of change. (Holling 1973, Holling and
Gunderson 2002, Walker et al. 2004, Walker and Salt 2006).
By viewing governance in a way that recognizes the social
and ecological systems as linked, resilience can be enhanced
both from the natural adaptive capabilities of the ecological
system and from the ability of the social system to respond to
an ecological problem by seeking to restore the ecosystem
(Folke et al. 2005, Zellmer and Gunderson 2009) or to prevent
harm. However, resilience in the context of the social part of
a social-ecological system must be viewed as more than a
means to alter how the social system interacts with the
ecological system to ensure ecological resilience. The key
difference between social and ecological systems is that the
actors in the social system have the ability to exercise free will
and conscious thought. Thus, the social system may choose
whether or not to foster resilience in the ecological system
(Walker et al. 2004, Folke et al. 2005). It is the goal of this
research to focus on procedural elements of governance
needed to increase the likelihood that the choice to foster
resilience is made.  
Given the high degree of uncertainty and complexity in
ecological systems, adaptive management, a process that
involves incremental changes and adjustments to management
as the consequences of various feedbacks become clear
through monitoring, has emerged as a recommended approach
to manage for ecological resilience (Holling 1978, Lee 1999,
Folke et al. 2005, Walker et al. 2004, Huitema et al. 2009).
Barriers to achieving adaptive management include the fact
that science alone is insufficient to convince social systems to
accept a particular decision. In addition, just as resilience
theory recognizes the multiple scales and cross-scale
interactions affecting ecosystems, governance occurs at
multiple scales and governance scales do not always mimic
those of ecosystems. This paper focuses on two components
of process that will be needed to help bridge the gap between
the type of adaptive response suggested by ecologists and the
decision making process in a system of governance: (1)
procedural elements to assure legitimacy in governance; and
(2) coordination across scales of governance to assure that
legitimacy carries through various scales of decision making.
These procedural components are presented as necessary to
achieving resilience while recognizing they are not sufficient
in themselves.
RESILIENCE THEORY AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT
The traditional approach to ecosystem management involves
a one-way flow of management by the social system with
services from the ecological system in return. The focus is
generally on the optimization of limited aspects of an
ecological system and suffers from the failure of synthesis to
accurately represent the emergent behavior of the system
(Cosens 2010). The failure of management through
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“optimization” to retain the full range of ecosystem services
is a key message of scholars working on the concept of
resilience (Zellmer and Gunderson 2009).  
Optimization, although intended to prevent loss of the targeted
component of the ecological system, not only fails to address
the complexity of the ecological system, it fails to account for
the complex feedback between the social and the ecological
system (Walker and Salt 2006). It ignores the basic feature of
complexity, that there will be a high level of uncertainty
surrounding the potential consequences of a particular action.
Resilience theory provides a framework for moving from
management through optimization to a more adaptive form of
management based on recognition of the complexity of an
ecological system and designed both to prevent adverse
scenarios from occurring and to adapt when change inevitably
does occur. It provides a framework for development of
governance to enhance the sustainability of the social-
ecological system. Because this paper attempts not only to
bridge the social-ecological divide, but the divide between
resilience theory and law, it is necessary to begin by defining
certain concepts because they will be used for these purposes. 
Although variations exist, there is a general consensus among
resilience theorists concerning the concepts critical to
discussing and applying resilience theory to ecological system
management. In discussing resilience theory a distinction must
be drawn between engineering and ecological resilience.
Although both resilience theories share many traits, “they
differ in terms of the mechanisms and strategies the systems
use to avoid being pushed so far as to be functionally
restructured. The engineering resilience strategy is to devote
all system resources to staying near to the equilibrium, the
goal being to snap back, whereas the ecological resilience
strategy accommodates the possibility of moving relatively
far from the equilibrium, with the goal being to avoid “flips”
from one structural state to another” (Ruhl 2011:1377). This
paper is focused on ecological resilience. 
To apply resilience theory to governance it is also necessary
to define the use of terms related to ecosystem management.
In resilience literature, scholars use the term governance to
describe the laws, policies, regulation, institutions, and
institutional structure involved in governing (Folke et al. 2005,
Huitema et al. 2009). Much of the literature calls on adaptive
management/governance to achieve resilience (Lee 1999,
Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al. 2009). The term “adaptive
management” has been used to describe a process of learning
through monitoring ecosystem response to a particular action,
followed by incremental change in the action based on what
is learned (Lee 1999, Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al. 2009)
and generally applies to management action by a single entity.
 
Boyle et al. (2001:122) help clarify the difference between
governance and adaptive management by stating that
“governance is the process of resolving trade-offs and of
providing a vision and direction for sustainability,
management is the operationalization of this vision ...”
Huitema et al. (2009) set forth four criteria for adaptive
governance: polycentricity, also referred to as legal pluralism
in legal scholarship (Roth et al. 2005), public participation, an
experimental approach to resource management, and
management at the bioregional scale. Thus, “adaptive
governance” includes the process of adaptive management,
but also reflects the collaboration and cooperation across
different levels of government and agencies, often with
overlapping authority, nongovernmental and individual action
apparent in a complex system (Folke et al. 2005). Governance
includes the processes of choosing among conflicting interests
over resource use and nonuse, and of setting goals for a
particular social-ecological system (Boyle et al. 2001). Thus,
adaptive governance is the term used when referring to action
by multiple jurisdictions and to the process of involving
multiple nongovernmental actors in decision making (Cosens
and Williams 2012). The concept of adaptive governance
captures the approach needed to foster resilience in the
ecological system, but does not capture all the elements needed
for social acceptance in democratic nations. In seeking to
bridge concepts of resilience to approaches to governance,
changes in management must include measures to assure the
social acceptance of management decisions. Within this
context, the aspect of adaptive governance addressed by this
paper is the procedures necessary to increase the likelihood
that an adaptive approach that fosters resilience will be chosen
and can function across multiple scales of governance and
ecological systems.
BRIDGING RESILIENCE THEORY AND ADAPTIVE
GOVERNANCE TO LAW
Similar to the consideration of resilience terminology, it is
necessary to explain the legal terminology used in this article.
Substantive laws govern what is managed, who is regulated,
and the goal of that management or regulation. Administrative
law governs how these functions are implemented (Stewart
2003), and is the focus of this paper. The term administrative
law is used in this article to refer to any law governing the
process of agency or governing body decision making; for
example, even though found in substantive law, this article
uses the term “administrative” law for process requirements
such as those found in the Environmental Impact Statement
requirements of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.) or the requirement of consultation
in the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §
§ 1531-1544). The procedural changes in the law to facilitate
the acceptance of adaptive governance can be addressed
through the concept of legitimacy.
LEGITIMACY
It is a basic tenant of political theory that people seek
legitimacy in the actions of those who govern them (Bodansky
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1999). Democracy therefore emerges as a system with a high
level of legitimacy, because through the process of electing
those who govern, people consent to their leadership.
However, when democratic nations move from implementation
of the law by elected officials to delegation of authority to
administrative agencies or appointed governing bodies, they
dilute the direct connection between the elected official and
the voters affected by regulation. As the administrative state
has grown, administrative law governing the process by which
agencies or appointed bodies take action has developed to fill
this gap in direct accountability. The direct accountability gap
increases with the scale of governance (Esty 2006). Thus, local
agencies may have a higher perception of legitimacy than
federal or international entities. At the local scale, fewer formal
protections are needed to assure accountability to the regulated
public. The introduction of flexibility to ecosystem
management challenges traditional sources of legitimacy, thus
presenting a barrier to adoption of new approaches. It is
through the use and modification of administrative law that
these challenges can be met. 
Daniel Esty (2006) outlines five sources of legitimacy
applicable to administrative entities in addition to the
democratic process. These five sources form a framework to
discuss additional changes to administrative law necessary to
assure legitimacy in a more adaptive approach to ecosystem
management. The five sources are: (1) results-based:
legitimacy derived from the fact that decisions are based on
objective expertise and the results can be determined to be
good; (2) order-based: legitimacy based on the fact that rules
are clear, stable, and publicly available; (3) systemic:
legitimacy based on the existence of checks and balances
among institutions; (4) deliberative: legitimacy based on the
inclusion of a public dialog in the process of decision making;
and (5) procedural: legitimacy derived from an open and
transparent process of decision making and an explanation for
the choices made.  
Richard Stewart’s review of the history of development of U.
S. administrative law in the 21st century (Stewart 2003) helps
illustrate its importance in addressing concerns with
legitimacy as larger and more powerful agencies were
established to address emerging societal problems, including
those involving the environment. To illustrate the importance
of process in rendering decisions legitimate, it is useful to
correlate those developments to the five sources of legitimacy
outlined above, then to place adaptive management in the
context of each particular source of legitimacy. In addition to
being insufficient to assure legitimacy in management
decision making when greater flexibility is delegated, these
mechanisms are not necessarily available when multijurisdictional
management, is involved. Assuring legitimacy across multiple
jurisdictions is discussed below. The following discussion is
placed in the context of U.S. federal administrative law; the
concepts are applicable at any governmental system struggling
to implement ecosystem management across multiple
jurisdictions.
Results-based legitimacy
Results-based legitimacy reliant on agency scientific expertise
began in the United States with Gifford Pinchot’s call for
scientific, federal management of the forests and
establishment of the National Forest Organic Act in 1897. (16
U.S.C. §§ 473-478, 479-482 and 551, June 4, 1897, as
amended 1905, 1911, 1925, 1962, 1964, 1968, and 1976) The
infusion of science into decision making has at its very core
the belief that the process will be more objective and the results
better. Reliance on scientific expertise is increasingly
questioned as a source of legitimacy because agency science
shows vulnerability to politicization (Wagner 1995, Doremus
2005, Ruhl and Salzman 2006, O’Reilly 2007, Cosens 2008).
Statutory language requiring use of “best available science,”
(e.g., U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act 42 USC §300g-1) has
been adopted in some environmental laws because trust for
objective science-based decision making has eroded.
However, exactly what is the “best available science” when
decision making involves areas of scientific uncertainty is
often unclear and that uncertainty can be used to distort
decision making in favor of a particular political agenda
(Wagner 1995, Doremus 2005, Ruhl and Salzman 2006,
O’Reilly 2007, Cosens 2008). 
In contrast to the discussion of the other four sources of
legitimacy where additional changes are needed to ensure
legitimacy, adaptive management can actually enhance
results-based legitimacy (Camacho 2009). The problem for
results-based legitimacy lies more in the improper
implementation of adaptive management than in the move to
a more flexible means of management. Adaptive management,
by definition, requires that the results of an agency action be
monitored and that the action be adjusted based on the
monitoring. However, despite lip service to increasing use of
adaptive management by agencies, data are rarely gathered to
verify the outcome of a particular action once it is taken
(Camacho 2009). Furthermore, even if data were collected
following agency action, agencies rarely have the authority to
modify the action. 
Reluctance to implement adaptive management lies, in part,
in failure to tie adjustment based on monitoring to agency
accountability. By imposing a requirement that progress
toward a particular goal must be accounted for and adjustment
made in the face of new data, the use of science to achieve the
goals of an interest group rather than the goal of a statute can
be reduced. In this way, legitimacy is served by adaptive
management.
Order-based legitimacy
Order-based legitimacy captures the concepts of stability and
finality, or at least predictive capability, regarding application
of the law. The expectation that rules will be stable and that
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finality can be achieved may present the most significant
barriers to authorization of the flexibility needed to implement
adaptive management. The expectation for finality is at the
core of many legal battles concerning the environment and
can be characterized as a basic conflict between science and
law. In simple terms, science is a search for the truth, whereas
litigation is a search for finality (Cosens 2008). Scientific
inquiry has no statute of limitations, no concept of res judicata.
Scientific methodology is a process of disproving what was
formerly thought to be true, of reinvestigating questions
thought solved, of reinterpreting information in light of new
discoveries (Kosso 2007). In contrast, civil litigation is
designed to finalize a dispute, to provide a forum where, no
matter how flawed the inquiry, a peaceful final resolution of
a dispute can be achieved.  
In environmental disputes, finality serves those with economic
interests in the environment by providing stability for
investment, whereas science serves those concerned with
sustaining the environment itself by continuing the search for
the true impacts of human action on the ecological system.
The fact that one side (the environmental side) of the litigation
equation seeks equal treatment for goals not served by civil
litigation destabilizes the system. Once a court provides a final
answer, the issues will be revisited with another legal theory.
Once the judicial system is exhausted, the issues will be
revisited in the legislature. Once the political system is
exhausted, the issues will be addressed through civil
disobedience. It is this reality, the fact that finality is often not
achieved through the current system of resolving
environmental disputes, that encourages a more incremental
and collaborative approach.  
Legitimacy in implementation of adaptive management will
require an approach that gives equitable treatment to both the
economic need for finality and the progress toward the true
system understanding needed to address environmental
concerns. Anecdotal evidence suggests that currently,
management relying on monitoring for adjustment uses a
biologic timeframe when the management action is developed
by a science-based agency (see e.g., USGS 2011, basing
monitoring on biological goals), and social timeframes when
negotiated (see e.g., Nez Perce Tribe, State of Idaho, and
United States Federal Government 2004, placing a 30 year
timeframe on a biological opinion to prevent jeopardy for
listed salmon and steelhead populations, to provide stability
for water users in the region). However, to foster ecological
resilience while maintaining legitimacy both ecological and
social timeframes must be considered when setting the pace
of incremental change. To place this in more practical terms,
it is a waste of resources to require reconsideration of a
particular action when it is too soon for the biologic system to
register change. At the same time, tying the adjustment cycle
to a 30 year development loan cycle may prevent adjustment
in time to prevent irreversible harm. At the other end of the
spectrum, short-term human interests that tend to coincide
with the elections cycle must not control the pace, yet must be
factored in seeking new approaches to management. A process
of negotiated timeframe setting in which both the biologic and
social timeframes are brought to the table with the goal of
providing stability while preventing irreversible harm is
recommended. It would be naïve to suggest that this goal
makes the negotiation any easier, but when combined with the
transparency and deliberative requirements, it may avoid an
approach that favors only one aspect of the social-ecological
system.
Systemic legitimacy
Systemic legitimacy is provided by the various checks over
agencies provided by both the judicial and legislative branch.
The ability to challenge an agency decision in court provides
greater assurance that decisions will be made within the
boundaries of the authorizing legislation and constitutional
limits. Separation of the legislative branch of government from
the implementing branch provides a check on unilateral
exercise of power. Movement toward adaptive management
should not eliminate various checks and balances and they will
not be treated in detail here. Instead, an additional systemic
check may be provided in the network approach to
coordination. A more open and frequent exchange of
information, harmonizing of rules, and periodic collaboration
across agencies and jurisdictions may prevent undue influence
at a particular level and can open decision making to broader
expert scrutiny. Multiscale checks may prove effective in
diluting agency capture and in bringing the public voice to
decision making as required by deliberative legitimacy.
Deliberative legitimacy
Deliberative legitimacy is reflected in the growing expectation
and provision for public comment in numerous aspects of
agency decision making from the requirement of notice and
comment in rulemaking to the increasing use of public
meetings to gain support for a decision. In the United States,
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
in 1969 can be considered the major turning point in public
involvement in agency decision making (Hirt and Sowards
2012). Unlike the requirements that meetings and records be
open to the public, NEPA imposes the affirmative duty on
agencies to develop, analyze, and provide to the public for
comment, information on the environmental impact of major
federal actions (U.S. National Environmental Policy Act 42
USC §4332). Although NEPA does not impose any
substantive requirement to choose the most environmentally
sustainable alternative (Vermont Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 [1978]), it arms the public with the
information necessary to participate in shaping the decision
through the political process. 
Implementation of adaptive management provides an
excellent opportunity to employ some of the newer methods
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of public involvement (Bingham 2009). It lends itself to use
of a procedure similar to negotiated rulemaking, in which the
agency collaborates with the regulated community and
interested parties to develop a rule for reaching decisions on
incremental changes in management. Small scale (spatial and
temporal) impacts may be reflected best in local knowledge,
thus a more collaborative process may improve the knowledge
base for the decision. A more collaborative approach to
management could also make use of the interagency networks
in the context of response scale to allow coordination of
adaptation and avoid unintended consequences of agency
action. The network approach may be necessary to allow for
manageable public input on jurisdictionally complex
ecosystems.
Procedural legitimacy
Procedural legitimacy is provided by transparency and is
reflected in many of the administrative requirements for notice
and comment, and the availability of judicial review. In
addition, beginning with the passage of the Freedom of
Information Act in 1966, (Public Law 104-231 codified at 5
USC §552) U.S. agencies must provide documents to citizens
on request. Not only must records be open to the public, but
meetings at which a decision might be made must be noticed
and open to the public (5 USC 552b). Finally, the availability
of judicial review of agency action extends to review of
compliance with agency procedural rules (5 USC §706(2)(D)).
Existing administrative procedures requiring open records,
meetings, notice, and comment must apply to incremental
decision making in adaptive management to assure procedural
legitimacy, but must also extend to the level of international
bodies when transboundary resources are involved.  
Incorporation of measures to assure legitimacy in proposed
changes to ecosystem management to allow a more adaptive
approach will enhance both management outcomes and public
acceptance, thus fostering both social and ecological
resilience. However, applying these concepts of legitimacy to
a complex social-ecological system requires moving from
discussion of management by a single entity to management
by multiple entities, jurisdictions, and at multiple levels. It
necessitates a means to coordinate and collaborate across
multiple jurisdictions and to manage meaningful deliberative
processes. As noted by Lee (1993:28) in reference to the
Columbia River Basin, “[e]ach of the major uses of the basin’s
resources is managed by a different constellation of human
institutions, each set of managers guards its rights and
prerogatives, and none is sufficiently powerful to bring the
others to heel. Multiple management of multiple uses produces
a tragedy of the commons.” Nevertheless, multiscalar, diverse,
overlapping authority can facilitate resilience in governance
systems, provided an adequate mechanism for coordination
across the particular ecological system is developed.
COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION ACROSS
MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS
The procedural measures discussed above foster legitimacy at
a single scale of governance or within an agency with a defined
scope of authority, but governance across an entire ecosystem
is rarely so simple. Furthermore, we do not write with a clean
slate. Jurisdictional boundaries and scales of governance may
ignore ecosystem boundaries for historic, cultural, or other
reasons unrelated to the needs of ecosystem management.
Resistance to change and slow incremental process with which
it occurs in a democratic system imposes a pragmatic
requirement that recommendations for changes in governance
begin with the current jurisdictional context as a baseline.
Rather than suggest a new form of governance, this article is
the beginning of a research effort seeking to make use of the
existing diversity and multiple scales of ecosystem
governance while developing means to integrate across and
within various scales. 
Cross-scale interactions may undermine legitimacy. A local
land use decision to build in a river floodplain may lead to
increased need for investment in storage across an
international boundary. Complicating the scale issue even
more are situations in which the source of the problem and the
negative impact occur at different scales thus removing any
incentive for action at the scale of the problem source (Long
2009). This situation highlights the need for response capacity
at multiple, linked scales. In the United States this mismatch
has resulted in a backlash to some environmental laws passed
in the 1970s. For example, the failure of states to take action
led to federal regulation to achieve clean water (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act], 33 U.S.C. §
§ 1251-1387), clean air (Clean Air Act [CAA], 42 U.S.C. §
§ 7401-7671q), and species protection (Endangered Species
Act [ESA] 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544). However, although the
scale of the problem is federal, the source may be local land
use planning in the case of nonpoint source pollution (Adler
et al. 1993), or local development of wetlands important to
filtration of polluted water and flood mitigation on a larger
scale (Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 [2006]; Cosens
2008), or local development that will endanger an obscure
species important to biodiversity in general (National
Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059
[D.C. Cir. 1997], cert. denied 524 U.S. 927 [1998]). Local
burden/large scale benefit has contributed to the backlash
against environmental regulation in the U.S. in recent years.
Legitimacy in decision making is lost if conscious recognition
of these cross-scale linkages is not accounted for in the process.
If the ecological system will not allow us to ignore the linkage
among scales, then it is advisable to approach the linkages
among agencies and jurisdictions consciously and build them
to facilitate adaptation. 
Adaptive governance moves from a focus on efficiency and
clean lines between jurisdictional authorities, to a focus on
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diversity, redundancy, and multiple levels of management,
including a role for local knowledge and local action. The
adaptive state of systems at scales above and below the scale
of a system of interest may enhance or detract from the
resilience of the system of interest (Walker et al. 2004, Walker
and Salt 2006). An outgrowth of the study of resilience in
ecological systems is the development of the concept of the
adaptive cycle to describe the state and evolution of a self-
organizing system and panarchy theory to describe the
hierarchical structure of adaptive cycles linked across scales
(Holling 2001, Holling and Gunderson 2002). These concepts
provide a useful metaphor when considering governance
across multiple jurisdictions.  
The adaptive cycle described by Holling (2001) contemplates
the possibility of a collapse phase that leads to innovations,
some of which will succeed. The idea that management for
resilience could mean allowing collapse of a system does not
instill faith in the approach by those who recognize stability
as one of the key factors in economic success. But panarchy
recognizes that adaptive cycles occur at many scales and that
linkage occurs across scales. The premise of the concept of
panarchy is that there will be linkage among the results of
actions at different scales whether or not strict legal lines are
drawn between authorities and jurisdictions. Higher, slower
cycles may provide stability for smaller scales to engage in
innovation and adaptation while minimizing the risk of
collapse (Holling 2001, Holling and Gunderson 2002).
Innovation and adaptation at smaller scales can feedback to
the maintenance of stability at larger scales. Viewed from the
perspective of the U.S. system, stable federal and state law
can provide room for local innovation. Similarly, stable EU
policy may provide room for member state innovation while
providing a forum for coordination and information exchange.
Nested scales of management authority thus allows for
adaptation while providing large scale stability. Although
matching the scale of governance to the scale of the problem
may be a theoretical goal (Ruhl and Salzman 2010), the scale
appropriate for one problem may not be relevant for another
(Ruhl and Salzman 2010), nor do complex systems always
have clearly identifiable scales for governance (Ruhl and
Salzman 2010). Thus, development of networks across scales
will account for the fact that although coordination may be
needed across an entire ecosystem, issues will arise at a variety
of scales. 
Two changes are needed to facilitate adaptable response at
multiple scales: (1) increased local capacity; and (2) vertical
and horizontal networks across jurisdictions and scales to
allow coordinated response among overlapping authorities
without high transaction costs.  
The need for local capacity with robust networks to multiple
levels can be seen more clearly if the example used is a sudden,
high-risk situation. It is on the local level, not the level of an
entity like the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, that a
major portion of the resources are needed for response to a
high risk emergency like Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.
However, without the link to assistance both from other
communities and from state, national, and international levels,
a disaster of such magnitude will be beyond the capacity of
any local government. Studies of postdisaster short and long-
term relief indicate that networks for coordination and clear
definition of roles must be addressed prior to a disaster if local
organizations are to be effectively used in providing relief
(Stys 2011).  
Taking the example of emergency response further, a proven
and highly robust system for multiagency/jurisdiction
networking is the incident command system for
multijurisdictional response to a large-scale, often mass
casualty, emergency. The incident command system
facilitates multientity response to an emergency in which the
scale and timing was highly uncertain prior to its occurrence
(see e.g., U.S. Forest Service 2000, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security 2012). Rather than create a new agency at
the scale of every conceivable emergency, the networks
provide a means for rapid crisis response across multiple
agencies at the same scale and through multiple scales of
agencies. Under this system no more than seven people or
entities report to the incident commander, no more than seven
to each of those seven, etc., until the on-the-ground response
to, for example, a wildfire, a flood, or an earthquake, may
involve hundreds or even thousands of people. In the author’s
experience as a search and rescue volunteer, the initial hours
or even days of response to a large scale emergency are often
chaotic, however, within a remarkably short period of time a
relatively smooth operation emerges in which information and
coordination of decisions in response to changes in the
problem flow rapidly within and between levels. Although
referred to by some as a “command and control” approach
(Stys 2011), the incident command system is highly adaptive
to meet the type, location, and scale of a disaster. The result
is a clear line of hierarchical authority leading to the “command
and control” description possibly necessary in a high risk
situation. However, it is the ease of formation of networks for
flow of information and resources made possible by the
conscious focus on cross-entity and cross-scale coordination
that serves as a lesson for ecosystem management. 
Much of the change and uncertainty in an ecosystem does not
occur on the time scale of an emergency. Establishment of
networks for management of slower processes in aquatic
ecosystems also exist in, for example, the move toward
integrated water resource management (Global Water
Partnership 2000 and 2002, European Union 2000). A formal
structure for integrated water resource management does not
currently exist in the United States, and yet studies show that
“weak ties” are nevertheless formed among individuals
working at various levels of government and nongovernmental
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organizations when large scale ecological issues arise (Ruhl
and Salzman 2010).  
Effective networks rely on the existence of certain social skills
among people within a network rather than a formal,
mandatory network structure (Folke et al. 2005). This is
consistent with the author’s experience in multijurisdictional
water negotiations in which success is often determined by
key personalities involved (Cosens 1998). Administrative law
and institutional structure cannot mandate the individuals
involved, but could be designed to maximize diversity, thus
increasing the likelihood that these personality types are
represented. Clearly there is also a role for institutions of
higher education to provide students with the skills necessary
to bring people together and to communicate across
boundaries.  
Any solution formalized in administrative process must strike
a balance between facilitation of network formation and
avoidance of a rigid structure that cannot adapt to changing
scale and differing types of problems. Lessons can be taken
from experience with systems like the incident command
system for emergency response to improve the capacity of
networks to form and act adaptively and to design
administrative law to facilitate flexibility.  
First, coordination and communication among different
entities works better if it is express (Bingham 2009). Thus, it
must be a requirement and assigned position within each
entity. Establishment of a network framework upfront can also
avoid transaction costs encountered with the ad hoc
development of a network after a problem is identified
(Huitema et al. 2009). Second, frequent information sharing
among entities may serve as a building block in the
relationships necessary for multijurisdictional decision
making. Third, substantial resources must be devoted to the
local scale. The current structure of resource availability, both
with respect to funding and people, for entities that manage
ecosystems may need to be inverted, with greater resources
made available at the local rather than national scale. Fourth,
harmonization of methods and regulations in the area of
overlap will result in more effective networks (Zaring 2009).
Fifth, attention must be given to striking the proper balance
between cohesion and diversity of network membership to
foster creative solutions, use of local knowledge, and adaptive
capacity. Through study of the topology of networks, scholars
have begun to identify key characteristics of effectiveness
(Bodin and Crona 2009). Although intuitively it might seem
that a cohesive group would be more likely to achieve self-
regulation, complex problems require a more diverse
membership. 
Finally, attention must be paid to the difference between
formal and informal networks. To effectively manage across
multiple entities, networks with low transaction costs are
needed (Huitema et al. 2009). One way to achieve this is to
build network formation into administrative process rather
than leaving it to be formed on an ad hoc basis when a problem
arises. Models for coordination across entities and scales
imbedded in administrative law could greatly reduce these
transaction costs. At the same time, caution is warranted in
any attempt to formalize the interaction across entities and
scales before understanding existing informal networks for
communication and action. Research by Bodin and Crona
(2009) suggest that informal networks appear to be more
successful than an imposed structure. Informal network
formation can be facilitated through capacity building,
identification of influential actors through use of social
network analysis prior to establishing lines of coordination,
encouraging broad participation, and providing a forum for
communication (Bodin and Crona 2009).
CONCLUSION
Moving from ecosystem management concepts designed to
handle uncertainty, to implementation by governance systems
requires careful attention to procedural elements to assure
legitimacy in implementation. Two areas of administrative
process may aid in reducing barriers to implementation of a
more adaptive approach to management and scale issues
associated with multiple jurisdictions: (1) procedural elements
to assure legitimacy in governance; and (2) coordination
across scales of governance to assure that legitimacy carries
through various scales of decision making. 
If resilience based management is chosen, restructuring the
current system is no small task. This paper looks primarily at
the administrative framework that must change from the model
of massive state and federal agencies to an infusion of
resources and capacity building at the local level, while
retaining overlapping state, federal, and international
programs to provide oversight and research and to coordinate
across multiple jurisdictions. Such reform will require
authorization for greater flexibility in decision making while
relying on public participation and input as a large source of
accountability. It will require expenditures on monitoring the
effects of decisions and the flexibility to respond to the results
of monitoring. In short, the recognition of the complexity in
the social-ecological system, coupled with a growing
realization of the complete dependence of the human race on
the ability of the ecological system to serve it, requires reform
of the administrative state to allow society to responsibly
respond to the challenge of managing human interaction with
ecosystems.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5093
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